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Note
The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departures
Based on a Defendant's Extraordinary Family
Ties and Responsibilities
Susan E. Ellingstad
The police arrested Mattie Lou Thomas for possessing four
kilograms of heroin.1 At the time, she was the sole guardian of
two mentally disabled adult children and her four-year-old
grandchild. 2 It was her first offense. Based upon Thomas's ex-
treme family responsibilities, the United States District Court
departed from the Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a period
of probation, rather than a six-year sentence.3 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's use of family
circumstances as a basis for departing from the Sentencing
Guidelines and remanded the case to the district court for re-
sentencing.4 When Thomas goes to prison, her mentally dis-
abled children will likely be placed in an institution and her
four-year-old grandchild in foster care; in addition, she could
permanently lose custody.5
Congress implemented the Sentencing Reform Act primar-
ily to eliminate disparity in sentencing. Uniformity in sentenc-
ing, however, is an elusive, perhaps unascertainable, ideal,
because sentencing involves individuals whose actions, charac-
ters, and backgrounds can never be truly uniform. The Thomas
example suggests that sentences, though numerically
equivalent between two defendants, may affect one defendant
more severely than another. Furthermore, innocent children,
1. United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 171 (1991).
2. Id at 529. Thomas was also sole guardian of a third mentally disabled
child who did not live with her. Id.
3. Id. at 527.
4. I& at 530.
5. One possible consequence of the incarceration of a parent is the per-
manent termination of parental rights. Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas
Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?:
An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 437-38 (1991).
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or other third parties, may suffer to achieve numerical equality
between defendants convicted of similar offenses.
This Note argues that a district court should be allowed to
depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines on the basis
of unusual family responsibilities. Part I of this Note describes
the statutory directives and legislative history of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act, the provisions and policy statements of the
Sentencing Guidelines, and judicial interpretations of both the
Act and the Guidelines. Part II analyzes the Guidelines and
critiques the courts' interpretations of them in light of the stat-
utory directives. Part II also suggests a better interpretation
based upon the congressional directives and a sociological anal-
ysis of the costs and benefits of incarcerating an offender with
extraordinary family responsibilities. This Note concludes that
extraordinary family circumstances should provide a basis for a
downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT: MIXED MESSAGES ON THE
COURT'S ROLE IN SENTENCING
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, American so-
cial scientists believed imprisonment served two main purposes:
retribution and punishment.6 In 1870, however, the National
Congress of Prisons advanced rehabilitation as the primary goal
of incarceration.7 Under the rehabilitative theory, the empha-
sis of criminal law began to shift from the nature of the crime
to the reformation of the criminal.8 Congress, the United
States Supreme Court, and state legislatures adopted the reha-
bilitative theory of imprisonment, which allowed for incarcera-
tion until the offender had reformed.9
6. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion. The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 893 (1990).
7. Id. Congress adopted the increasingly popular "positivist criminology"
theory in which crime was analogized to a curable disease: Physicians, upon
discovering disease, cannot name the day upon which the patient will be
healed; no more can judges intelligently set the day of release from prison at
the time of trial. Id. at 893 n.62 (quoting NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSER-
VANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (WICKERSHAM COMM'N), REPORT ON PENAL INSTI-
TUTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE 142-43 (1931)).
8. "[Plunishment is directed not to the crime but to the criminal.... The
supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals and not the
infliction of vindictive suffering." Id. at 893 (quoting AMERICAN CoRREc-
TIONAL A5S'N, TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PRISONS AND
REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE (1870)).
9. Id at 894-95. Congress officially implemented an indeterminate sen-
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By 1975, the popularity of the indeterminate sentencing
system had significantly diminished. Studies confirmed an in-
crease in recidivism despite the efforts of many rehabilitative
programs.' 0 Congress concluded that rehabilitation fell outside
the scope of incarceration." Furthermore, studies of indetermi-
nate sentencing revealed gross disparity in the types and
lengths of sentences. 2 Some studies linked the variance in
sentences to discriminatory factors such as race, sex, income,
education, and social status.13 Other studies speculated that the
disparities resulted from the "unfettered discretion" conferred
upon judges,14 in addition to the lack of clearly defined sentenc-
ing goals and criteria. 5
In an attempt to eliminate the widespread sentencing dis-
tencing system in 1910. Id. Under this system, the judge would impose a sen-
tence from within a congressionally prescribed range. After the defendant had
served one-third of the sentence, the parole board would determine the length
of the prison term remaining, which it calculated by the amount of time yet
required for the defendant's rehabilitation. Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at
394. The Supreme Court approved this Congressional scheme in 1949. Nagel,
supra note 6, at 895. By 1960, every state in the country had passed an indeter-
minate sentencing system. Id at 894.
10. Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 395.
11. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221-23 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
12. Nagel, supra note 6, at 897. Statistical studies of sentencing in the Sec-
ond Circuit, for example, revealed that sentences for the identical crime could
range from three to 20 years imprisonment. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988).
13. Nagel, supra note 6, at 895. Racial discrimination, for example, "Was
reflected in stiffer sentences for minority defendants than for Caucasians who
had committed the same crimes, and in the greater tendency to incarcerate
'street' criminals than sophisticated white-collar criminals." Karle & Sager,
supra note 5, at 396. The indeterminate sentencing system afforded judges the
liberty to invoke "their own theories regarding criminal sanctions" as well as
their individual "biases and prejudices." d. Moreover, the discretionary
sentences were not subject to review except in limited circumstances, such as a
sentence based upon religion or another constitutionally prohibited factor.
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1942-43 & n.27 (1988).
14. SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3221.
15. "The bulk of the variance... relates to the judge's perceptions regard-
ing the overall goals of sentences-both the importance attached to the goals
and evaluations of how well the goals are being accomplished." Kevin Clancy
et al., Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Ex-
tent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 552
(1981). Studies also attributed the variance in the length of prison sentences
to differences between judges-differences, for example, in their political ide-
ologies, regions of the country in which they sit, and communities in which
they were raised. Id at 551.
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parity, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(the Act).16 The Act created the United States Sentencing
Commission (the Commission) and assigned it the task of for-
mulating guidelines and policies17 which would maintain consis-
tency, fairness, and sufficient flexibility in sentencing.'8 The
16. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-673
(1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)). In addition to the reduction of sentencing
disparity, Congress sought through the Act to achieve "honesty in sentencing."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3225. Under the indeterminate sentencing
system, the sentence pronounced by the judge did not represent the actual
length of time the defendant would serve in prison. The Parole Commission
made the final incarcerative decision. Breyer, supra note 12, at 4. Thus, Con-
gress eliminated parole; under the Act, judges impose the actual, "honest" sen-
tence. I&i
17. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (1988) authorizes the Commission to promulgate
"general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other
aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation."
18. The Sentencing Commission shall:
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal con-
duct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not
taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing
practices.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988). 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988) outlines the process by
which a judge should impose a sentence in accordance with the purposes of
sentencing:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence-
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than nec-
essary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of the
subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-
spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defend-
ant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vo-
cational training, medical care, or other correctional treat-
ment in the most effective manner,
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1)
and that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Com-
mission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the
date the defendant is sentenced;
[Vol. 76:957
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Commission completed its guidelines 9 in 1987.
One source of controversy arising from the Sentencing
Guidelines concerns the amount of flexibility and discretion
that Congress intended the courts to retain. Of particular un-
certainty is the courts' authority to consider offender character-
istics, including a defendant's family obligations, in departing
from the Sentencing Guidelines.20 The Act created tension be-
tween the previous indeterminate sentencing system, with its
focus on the individualized sentence, and the new system, with
its focus on numerical equality for defendants convicted of sim-
ilar crimes.2 '
Despite the shift in focus, a majority of the Act's provisions
retain some discretion for judges. Congress expressly stated in
the Act that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may
receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence."22 Congress also allowed judges to depart from the
Guidelines in limited circumstances. The Act allows a court to
depart from a specified sentence if the judge determines that
there is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance "of a kind,
or to a degree" which the Sentencing Commission failed to con-
sider adequately.2
The legislative history of the Act similarly reflects the in-
tent that courts retain discretion to impose individualized
sentences in special cases. The Senate Judiciary Committee in-
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among de-
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of simi-
lar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988).
19. UNrrD STATES SENTENCING CoMM'N, GUIDLEs MANUAL (1991)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
20. See generally Ogletree, supra note 13, at 1944-54 (describing the his-
tory of the Sentencing Guidelines and the Guidelines' directives regarding of-
fender characteristics).
21. The statutory specifications concerning terms of imprisonment illus-
trate the congressional emphasis on similar offenses receiving numerically
similar sentences. One provision states: "If a sentence specified by the guide-
lines includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the range established
for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the
greater of 25 percent or 6 months." 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988). Thus, Con-
gress restricted the acceptable level of disparity for a specific offense to 25%.
See Ilene H. Nagel, Symposium on Alternative Punishments Under the New
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1 FED. SENTENCING REP. 102, 102 (1988).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
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structed judges to examine the characteristics of each specific
offender thoughtfully and comprehensively.2 The Committee
believed the Guidelines would "actually enhance the individual-
ization of sentences as compared to current law."''
Other provisions of the Act conflict, however, with the
above discretionary language. Section 994,26 which enumerates
the duties of the Sentencing Commission, reflects the congres-
sional ambiguity toward offender characteristics. For example,
section 994(a) requires the Commission to promulgate sentenc-
ing guidelines and policy statements "consistent with all perti-
nent provisions of this title and title 18."-' This reference
suggests that courts should include background and character
in the computation of all sentences. 28 Section 994(d) similarly
directs the Commission to consider certain offender character-
istics, including family ties and responsibilities, to the extent it
finds such characteristics relevant.2 Congress specified that
the only factors to which both guidelines and policy statements
24. SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3235. "The purpose of the sentenc-
ing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appro-
priateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the
thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences." Id.
25. I& at 3235-36 (emphasis added). "The bill requires the judge, before
imposing sentence, to consider the history and characteristics of the offender,
the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the purposes of sentencing."
Id. (emphasis added). Congress explicitly approved the imposition of sen-
tences outside the Guidelines in situations where aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances are not, in the opinion of the judge, adequately considered. Id. at
3234-35. Moreover, Congress intended to consider the case law resulting from
appeals of sentences above and below the guideline range in subsequently re-
fining and amending the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 3235.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988). Title 18 empowers judges with broad discre-
tion. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) grants the courts sweeping discretion to con-
sider a defendant's background or character in the sentencing decision. See
supra text accompanying note 22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988) lists the history and
characteristics of the defendant as the first factors a court should consider
when imposing a sentence. See supra note 18.
29. The Commission in establishing categories of defendants for use
in the guidelines and policy statements governing the imposition of
sentences of probation, a fine, or imprisonment, governing the imposi-
tion of other authorized sanctions... shall consider whether the fol-
lowing matters, among others, with respect to a defendant, have any
relevance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents of
an appropriate sentence, and shall take them into account only to the
extent that they do have relevance-
(1) age;
(2) education;
(3) vocational skills;
(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such con-
[Vol. 76:957
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should remain neutral were "race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status of offenders.1
3 0
In contrast, in section 994(e) Congress directed the Com-
mission to "assure that the guidelines and policy statements, in
recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of
imprisonment, reflect the general inappropriateness of consid-
ering the education, vocational skills, employment record, fam-
ily ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the
defendant. '31 The legislative history pertaining to section
994(e) states, however, that Congress intended courts to employ
these factors in other facets of the sentencing decision, such as
when considering day leave necessary for a defendant to retain
employment,32 the use of furlough, the location of the prison,
and the use of probation in lieu of incarceration.3 The restric-
tive language of section 994(e) appears to conflict with the
broad grants of discretion in subsections 994(a) and (d).
B. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: ADDING TO THE CONFUSION
The Sentencing Reform Act's conflicting directives left the
Sentencing Commission with a choice about the appropriate
dition mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent
that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant;
(5) physical condition, including drug dependence;
(6) previous employment record;
(7) family ties and responsibilities;
(8) community ties;
(9) role in the offense;
(10) criminal history; and
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988).
30. Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3357.
33. Id. Congress stated that a court, in an appropriate case, may consider
the factors proscribed in § 994(e) to impose a term of probation in lieu of im-
prisonment if probation will ensure the public's safety. Id- at 3357-58. Al-
lowing probation as a substitute for incarceration appears to conflict with the
plain language of § 994(e), which characterizes the enumerated considerations
as "generally inappropriate" for "recommending a term of imprisonment or
length of a term of imprisonment." Id at 3357. The legislative history, how-
ever, emphasizes that the Committee intentionally described the enumerated
factors as "generally inappropriate" rather than "always inappropriate" to al-
low the Commission to explore their relevance. Id at 3358. Congress intended
§ 994(e) to serve as guidance--cautionary, not proscriptive. Id- Moreover, the
cautionary language served "to guard against the inappropriate use of incarcer-
ation for those defendants who lack education, employment, and stabilizing
ties." IAE
1992]
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weight to give offender characteristics.3 The Sentencing Com-
mission chose to ignore them altogether.-5
In the majority of the other sections, the Commission's
guidelines parallel the discretionary language of the Sentencing
Reform Act,36 but the Commission adopted a restrictive inter-
pretation in the area of offender characteristics. 37 As a result,
several guideline provisions about judicial discretion and rele-
vant sentencing considerations conflict.
Consistent with the Sentencing Reform Act, the Guidelines
call for an active judicial role in determining whether to depart
from the Guidelines' recommended sentence. Although the
Guidelines generally direct courts to determine an appropriate
sentence by matching the offense categories with the offender
characteristic categories,3 the Commission acknowledged that
a court may depart from that prescribed range if a particular
case should present "atypical features."3 9 The Guidelines also
limit the information the judge may regard in her sentencing
decision by prohibiting consideration of certain factors, but gen-
34. Breyer, supra note 12, at 19-20.
35. The Commission debated extensively over offender characteristics and
the proper impact to afford them in sentencing. Id at 19. Ultimately, those
opposing the inclusion of offender characteristics as relevant considerations
won the debate, in what Judge Breyer labels the traditional "trade-off." IH at
19-20.
36. See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 1B1.4 (paralleling 18 U.S.C. § 3661
(1988)).
37. See id at ch. 5, pt. H (discussing specific offender characteristics).
38. The Guidelines contain a two-dimensional Sentencing Table. One axis
represents offense behavior categories and the other represents offender char-
acteristic categories. Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 400. Each combination of
categories yields an applicable range of months of imprisonment. Id To de-
termine the incarceration range in a robbery case, for example, a judge would
coordinate the offense behavior category, which might include the elements
bank robbery, committed with a gun, and $2500 stolen, with the offender char-
acteristic category, which might consist of one prior conviction not resulting in
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G., supra note 19, at I (presenting an example in in-
troductory materials to the Guidelines). For a complete overview of the of-
fense and offender categories, see i& at 279-81 (presenting a sentencing table
and commentary).
39. U.S.S.G., supra note 19, at 1 (introducing the Guidelines).
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline
as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the con-
duct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical
case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but
where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may con-
sider whether a departure is warranted.
Id at 5-6. In such a case, the court must articulate the reasons for departure.
Id. at 1. The Sentencing Guidelines marked the first time judges were re-
quired to justify their departures. Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 396.
[Vol. 76:957
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erally the Commission stated its intention not to limit the fac-
tors a court may consider.4°
The Commission specifically allowed judges to depart
downward because of a defendant's substantial assistance to au-
thorities.41 Instead of providing additional specific bases for de-
parture, the Commission listed factors which might constitute
grounds for departure but which the Commission admittedly
did not discuss.42 The Commission stated that it did not intend
this list of factors to be exhaustive.4s Rather, the Commission
stated that the departure decision would fall within the discre-
tion of the courts." A court could depart even though the Com-
40. The Guidelines exclude several factors from consideration in a down-
ward departure. These include race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-
economic status, physical condition, coercion and duress. U.S.S.G., supra note
19, §§ 5H1.4, .10, 5K2.12. "With those specific exceptions, however, the Com-
mission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned
anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in
an unusual case." Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
In addition, one guideline section parallels the sweepingly broad § 3661 of
Title 18: "[I]n determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range,
or whether a departure from the Guidelines is warranted, the court may con-
sider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, charac-
ter and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law." Id§ 1B1.4. The commentary to this section, however, while reiterating the con-
gressional intent not to limit background considerations, also mentions that
under some policy statements, "certain factors should not be considered for
any purpose, or should be considered only for limited purposes." Id § 1B1.4
cmt. This limitation refers to the policy statements in Chapter Five, Part H
(Specific Offender Characteristics) of the Sentencing Guidelines. In Chapter
Five, the Commission enumerates three offender characteristics which it
deems relevant in imposing the appropriate sentence. These characteristics
are the defendant's role in the offense, the defendant's criminal history, and
the defendant's dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood. I&?§§ 5H1.7, .8, .9. The Commission deemed three of the 11 factors listed in 28
U.S.C. § 994(d) as appropriate for consideration in sentencing. Congress di-
rected the Commission to consider the relevancy of the 11 in establishing de-
fendant categories. See supra note 29.
41. U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 5K1.1. Ironically, the allowance of a down-
ward departure for government cooperation results in tremendous sentencing
disparity because the departure is not reflective of a defendant's culpability.
Thomas W. Hillier, II, Congressional Oversight, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP: 224,
226 (1990). Typically, the least culpable defendants will not benefit from the
cooperation departure because they possess information least vital to the case.
Thus, the most culpable defendants receive relatively lenient sentences based
upon their greater ability to assist the government. I&
42. U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 5K2.0. These factors include physical injury,
extreme psychological injury, victim's conduct, and lesser harms. Id §§ 5K2.2,
.3,.10,.11.
43. Id. at 6.
44. The Sentencing Guidelines state:
Circumstances that may warrant departure from the guidelines pur-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mission adequately considered the specific factor.4
While promulgating the preceding provisions that suggest
broad judicial discretion, the Commission also issued several
policy statements greatly restricting the information the judge
may consider in departing from the Guidelines.46 In these pol-
icy statements, the Commission, after electing not to consider a
defendant's family ties and responsibilities in devising offender
categories, 47 deemed that family responsibilities and other per-
sonal characteristics should be "not ordinarily relevant in de-
termining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
guideline range."4 Instead, the Commission stated that family
responsibilities may be relevant in determining restitution or
fines.49
C. CASE LAW: DISAGREEMENT OVER THE PERMISSIBILITY OF
FAMILY CONSIDERATIONS IN DEPARTURES FROM THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Not surprisingly, in light of the inconsistencies between the
statutory directives and the Sentencing Guidelines, and the in-
consistencies within both, the federal courts disagree over
whether to consider a defendant's atypical family ties and re-
sponsibilities in determining an appropriate sentence.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have narrowly interpreted
the Guidelines to preclude consideration of a defendant's family
responsibilities in sentencing, regardless of the extraordinary or
suant to this provision cannot, by their very nature, be comprehen-
sively listed and analyzed in advance. The controlling decision as to
whether and to what extent departure is warranted can only be made
by the courts.... Any case may involve factors in addition to those
identified that have not been given adequate consideration by the
Commission.... Similarly, the court may depart from the guidelines,
even though the reason for departure is taken into consideration in
the guidelines (e.g., as specific offense characteristic or other adjust-
ment), if the court determines that, in light of unusual circumstances,
the guideline level attached to that factor is inadequate.
Id. § 5K2.0 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. The Commission drafted the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines
in the form of beth guidelines and policy statements. The latter indicated ten-
tative policies which had not evolved to the stage of a presumptively valid
guideline. Marc Miller & Daniel Freed, Offender Characteristics and Victim
Vulnerability: The Differences Between Policy Statements and Guidelines, 3
FED. SENTENCING REP. 3, 4 (1990). See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying
text (discussing the authoritative weight of policy statements).
47. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
48. U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 5H1.6 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
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burdensome nature of those responsibilities. In United States v.
Thomas,50 the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Guidelines to
preclude a court from considering family responsibilities in a
downward departure.5 1 The court focused primarily on the pro-
vision of the Guidelines allowing a downward departure for a
defendant's substantial assistance to authorities. 52 Invoking a
canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis,53 the court
concluded that because the Sentencing Commission did not spe-
cifically authorize a downward departure for factors unrelated
to the defendant's cooperation, it did not intend that these fac-
tors should warrant a downward departure.M The defendant
argued that the Guidelines- explicitly direct the court to con-
sider "without limitation" the background and character of a
defendant.sa Rejecting this argument, the court found that the
policy statement declaring family ties and responsibilities "not
ordinarily relevant" 57 trumped the "without limitation" provi-
sion.-5 Admittedly interpreting the guideline provisions nar-
rowly, the court read the policy statement listing instances
where family responsibilities are definitely relevant as all-
inclusive.59
50. 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
51. I& at 530.
52. See id. at 528-31. The district court had strayed from the Guidelines,
in part because Mrs. Thomas provided substantial assistance to the govern-
ment, and in part because she had unusual family circumstances. Id. at 529.
53. "Of the same kind, class, or nature." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 517
(6th ed. 1990). 'Where general words follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." 2A
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN, § 47.17, at 188 (Nor-
man J. Singer eL, 5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (footnotes omitted).
Courts invoke this canon when applying an arguably ambiguous statute to a
particular set of facts in order to ascertain the probable legislative intent in
such a situation. For an example of the application of ejusdem generis, see
Heathman v. Giles, 374 P.2d 839 (Utah 1962).
54. Thomas, 930 F.2d at 529.
55. U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 1B1.4.
56. Thomas, 930 F.2d at 529. The defendant maintained that the district
court departed under both § IB1.4, the discretionary provision, and § 5K1.1,
which allows departure based upon substantial assistance to the government.
I&.
57. U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 5H1.6.
58. Thomas, 930 F.2d at 529.
59. Id& at 530. Section 5H1.6 lists restitution and fines as sentencing con-
texts in which family circumstances are relevant. U.S.S.G., supra note 19,
§ 5H1.6. "[Section] 5H1.6 contains no language suggesting that this list is
merely illustrative rather than exhaustive.... [T]he Commission's affirmative
statement that family responsibilities are relevant when probation is an option
suggests that the Commission did not intend them to be relevant when, as
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In United States v. Brady,6° the Ninth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion after a cursory analysis of the issue. The de-
fendant, convicted of one count of bank robbery, challenged as
a violation of due process the district court's refusal to consider
his family ties and responsibilities.61 The court, however, char-
acterized the defendant's due process challenge as a facial chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, and
not as an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of his
sentence.62 The court found that because the Guidelines allow
courts to consider family responsibilities in sentencing within
the applicable range, the defendant's claim actually concerned
the weight granted to those factors rather than the Guidelines'
consideration of them.63 Because, in the Ninth Circuit's view,
courts have historically refused to permit a defendant to chal-
lenge the weight sentencing courts accord to various sentencing
factors under the individualized sentencing system, the defend-
ant's claim failed.64
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit determined that a court may
depart from the Guidelines because of extremely unusual fam-
ily circumstances.as In United States v. Brewer,6 the defend-
ants, both bank tellers, periodically embezzled a total of $28,000
from their employer bank.67 The district court departed down-
ward from the guideline range, in part because of the defend-
ants' prompt restitution, their degree of remorse, community
support for the defendants, and because both defendants had
small children at home who needed their care.68 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit recognized the possibility of sentencing below the
guideline range in cases where there are exceptional mitigating
here, probation is not a sentencing option." Thomas, 930 F.2d at 530 (citations
omitted).
60. 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 543.
62. Id.
63. Id. In its analysis, the court assumes that because the Guidelines men-
tion family responsibilities, courts automatically consider that factor and,
therefore, the lack of consideration is not an issue. See id.
64. The court was not concerned with the possible lack of an individual-
ized sentence. The court rested its superficial analysis on the assumption that
a defendant's individual due process rights were more at risk under the preex-
isting discretionary sentencing system than under the Guidelines. See id. at
542-44.
65. See United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir.) (giving an
overview of the split among the circuits), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
66. 899 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990).
67. Id. at 505.
68. Id. at 505-06.
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circumstances not adequately considered by the Sentencing
Commission.69 The court, however, found the defendant's miti-
gating circumstances not sufficiently exceptional to warrant
departure.1 0
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits are internally split
on the issue of family obligations. 1 The panels refusing to de-
69. Id. at 506-08.
70. "Although a short prison term may impose hardship, 'unfortunately, it
is not uncommon for innocent young family members, including children...
to suffer as a result of a parent's incarceration."' Id at 508 (quoting United
States v. Fiterman, 732 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1989)). Furthermore, the court
did not want to base its decision solely on the sex of the defendants, which is
prohibited under Guideline § 5H1.10. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
In another Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Davern, 937 F.2d 1041 (6th
Cir. 1991), the court employed its departure authority without hesitation.
Although Davern involved the appellate review of an upward departure for
aggravating circumstances in a drug offense, id. at 1043, rather than a down-
ward departure for unusual family obligations, the court's analysis relates to
this discussion. The court based its analysis of the Sentencing Guidelines on 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(b), the statutory directive relating to the imposition of a sen-
tence. Id at 1043-44; see supra note 18. The court followed in sequence the
factors enumerated in the statute. Davern, 937 F.2d at 1044-45. In accordance
with the first subsection, the court viewed its first duty as imposing a sentence
"'not greater than necessary to comply' with [the] 'purposes"' of sentencing
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. The court next addressed the provision in-
structing courts to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)
(1988). Because § 3553(a) does not mention the Guidelines as a consideration
until further down the list, the court refused to view the Guidelines as a sen-
tencing imperative until the court had "first considered the facts in light of
these qualitative first principles." Davern, 937 F.2d at 1044 (footnote omitted).
The court then analyzed § 3553(b), which allows a departure from the Guide-
lines in the event of aggravating or mitigating circumstances not adequately
considered. Rather than interpreting this provision as a narrow exception, the
court read it as "stat[ing] that the sentencing court is not bound by the guide-
lines if there is in the case 'an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines."' Id. The Davern court thus inter-
preted the Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act together. In
the case of conflict, the court viewed the Act as controlling. See id. at 1045.
71. See United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 768-69 (5th Cir. 1989) (court
refused to sustain an upward departure based upon a defendant's prominent
family ties and education, yet acknowledged courts' departure power in the ex-
traordinary case). Compare United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir.)
(recognizing that a defendant's family circumstances may constitute grounds
for departure in the extraordinary case), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 214 (1991);
United States v. Shortt, 919 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding it "legally
possible" to justify a departure with extraordinary family circumstances); and
United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 918-19 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (per-
mitting the consideration of family ties and responsibilities in a downward de-
parture) with United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990)
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part have focused almost exclusively on the "general inappro-
priateness" phrase of the Sentencing Reform Act and the "not
ordinarily relevant" phrase of the Sentencing Guidelines.7 2
The courts acknowledging family ties as grounds for departure
have analyzed the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act and
the Sentencing Guidelines in totality, and have viewed even the
restrictive language as permissive rather than prohibitive. In
United States v. Shortt,7 3 for example, the Eighth Circuit em-
ployed the "not ordinarily relevant" language not as a bar, but
rather as a starting point from which to determine whether the
defendant's family responsibilities qualified as extraordinary,
thus warranting departure.7 4
II. ANALYSIS
A. THE DEFICIENCIES OF TM SENTENCING COMMISSION AND
THE COURTS
The confusion over the relevance of family responsibilities
began with the Commission's restrictive interpretation of the
statutory directives relating to offender characteristics.7 5 In
(finding the Sentencing Guidelines preclude the consideration of family and
community ties in a downward departure); United States v. Lara-Velasquez,
919 F.2d 946, 955-57 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that offender characteristics should
never constitute the basis for departure from the Guidelines); and United
States v. Sutherland, 890 F.2d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (finding
§ 5H1.6 a "clear statement" that family considerations are not a ground for
departure).
72. In United States v. Sutherland, for example, the court cited Sentenc-
ing Guideline § 5H1.6 ("not ordinarily relevant") and concluded that "Suther-
land's argument has no merit in view of the clear statement in the guidelines
with respect to this subject." Sutherland, 890 F.2d at 1043; see also United
States v. Prestemon, 929 F.2d 1275, 1277-78 (8th Cir.) (refusing to depart based
upon the "not ordinarily relevant" language of Sentencing Guideline § 5111.6),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 220 (1991); United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th
Cir. 1989) (finding the defendant's current "family ties and responsibilities"
and prior "unstable upbringing" insufficient factors to warrant a downward
departure from the Guidelines), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2622 (1990).
73. 919 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1990).
74. Id at 1328; see also United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32
(8th Cir. 1990) (noting the "not ordinarily relevant" phrase and concluding
that the defendant's offender characteristics are extraordinary and of a magni-
tude not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission). For a thor-
ough analysis of the statutory directives, the legislative history, and the
Guidelines, see United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632 (E.D. Wash. 1990),
vacated, 952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp.
1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
75. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. As Judge Breyer makes
clear, the Sentencing Commission did possess the ability to choose which pol-
icy to enforce:
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choosing to interpret the Act restrictively, the Sentencing Com-
mission removed much of the flexibility and individuality in
sentencing that Congress intended courts to retain.76 The first
provision directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines in
accordance with Title 18.77 Title 18 delegated the authority to
the Commission to grant courts unlimited discretion to consider
a defendant's background and character.78 In a separate provi-
sion, Congress required the Commission to consider eleven dif-
ferent offender characteristics to the extent that they were
relevant.79 The legislative history also illustrates Congress's in-
tent that offender characteristics significantly factor into the
sentencing decision.80
In light of these clear directives in the Act and the leg-
islative history, the Commission could have either regarded sec-
tion 994(e) ("general inappropriateness") as somewhat
anomalous and, thus, accorded it less weight, or attempted to
interpret the section in a way more consistent with the other
provisions. Instead, the Commission focused primarily on sec-
tion 994(e), which qualifies several offender characteristics as
generally inappropriate in imposing a term of imprisonment.8 '
Thus inclined, the Commission attributed relevance to only
three of the eleven characteristics that Congress had instructed
it to consider in devising offender categories: role in the of-
fense,8 2 criminal history, 3 and dependence on criminal activity
The Commission extensively debated which offender characteristics
should make a difference in sentencing, that is, which characteristics
were important enough to warrant formal reflection within the
Guidelines and which should constitute possible grounds for depar-
ture.... [Some] argued that factors such as age, employment history,
and family ties should be treated as mitigating factors.
Breyer, supra note 12, at 19.
76. Although the Sentencing Commission was expected to draft
guidelines and develop policy statements that would eliminate dispari-
ties, it was also expected to develop policy statements that would
leave federal judges with sufficient flexibility to impose individualized
sentences warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken
into consideration in the general sentencing guidelines.
Ogletree, suprm note 13, at 1946.
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) (granting sweeping authority to courts in
the consideration of background factors).
79. See supra note 29 (listing the characteristics provided in 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(d) (1988)).
80. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988)).
82. U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 5H1.7.
83. I& § 5H1.8.
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for a livelihood.84 The Commission precluded departure based
on the other eight factors, including family responsibilities, by
deeming them "not ordinarily relevant" to sentencing deci-
sions.8 5 With virtually no supporting data or research regard-
ing the relevance of offender characteristics, 86 the Commission
dictated what courts may and may not consider as relevant.8 7
The confusion over family obligations became more in-
grained when the issue reached the courts. Relying on the
Commission's flawed determination, courts concluded that fac-
84. Id. § 5H1.9.
85. Id § 5H1.6.
86. The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act illustrates that
Congress
encourage[d] the Sentencing Commission to explore the relevancy to
the purposes of sentencing of all kinds of factors, whether they are
obviously pertinent or not; to subject those factors to intelligent and
dispassionate professional analysis; and on this basis to recommend,
with supporting reasons, the fairest and most effective guidelines it
can devise.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3358. The Sentencing Commission, how-
ever, published no evidence to support the finding that "offender characteris-
tics are not 'ordinarily relevant"' to the sentencing process. Miller & Freed,
supra note 46, at 4. Because of an unrealistic timetable to implement the
Guidelines, the Commission failed to subject the Guidelines to a "field test" by
judges, attorneys, and probation officers, or to any type of study concerning
the effect of personal factors on sentencing. Ogletree, supra note 13, at 1950.
Similarly, the Commission offered no rationale behind the offender char-
acteristic policy statements when it submitted the original guidelines to Con-
gress in 1987. Miller & Freed, supra note 46, at 4.
Considering the substantial time constraints under which the Com-
mission labored to complete an initial set of guidelines by May 1987, it
was not unreasonable to have formulated-as a starting point-some
tentative policies regarding offender characteristics. At the very least,
those policies had the virtue of challenging judges to justify and share
with the Commission their reasons for invoking sentencing factors as
to which the Commission had little information.
Id. The Sentencing Commission acknowledged the nonauthoritative nature of
these statements by titling them "policy statements" and explaining that, in-
stead of specifying each adequately considered factor, "'the Commission does
not so limit the courts' departure power."' Id. (citing UNITED STATES SEN-
TENCING CO1MM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1A4(b) (1987)).
87. Commenting on the Sentencing Guidelines, Judge Weinstein reacted
unfavorably to the Commission's determination of offender characteristics as
irrelevant:
I have never sentenced a defendant for whom all of these personal
factors were irrelevant. Their elimination from the guidelines is dis-
appointing-and strays from the spirit of the legislation. It tilts the
sentencing determination too much in the direction of retribution,
and places too little emphasis on factors that would mitigate the pun-
ishment in individual cases.
Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's First Impression of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REv. 1, 12 (1988).
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tors other than the three affirmatively stated as relevant are
not essential to an individualized sentence.88 The court in
United States v. Brady placed the burden upon the defendant
to prove the necessity of considering factors, such as a defend-
ant's family ties, which are unrelated to the defendant's culpa-
bility. 9 The Brady court, relying solely on the experimental
policy statement deeming family ties "not ordinarily rele-
vant,"' 9 concluded that only criminal history factors, as op-
posed to personal history factors, need be considered to impose
an individualized sentence.9'
Courts which attribute such credence to the restrictive lan-
guage of the Guidelines neglect the permissive language. The
court in United States v. Lara-Velasquez,92 for example, justi-
fied its position that offender characteristics may never consti-
tute a basis for departure by misconstruing a guideline section
granting it broad authority in sentencing (the "without limita-
tion" provision). The court held that the "without limitation"
provision applies only to the determination of sentences within
the guideline range.93 The "without limitation" language of
the provision, however, applies also in the determination of
whether to depart from the Guidelines.94
These interpretations are not only contrary to the majority
of the Sentencing Reform Act provisions and their legislative
history, but also to the congressional intent behind section
994(e) itself. The legislative history indicates that Congress dis-
couraged courts from considering family ties and responsibili-
ties, education, and vocational skills merely to "guard against
the inappropriate use of incarceration for those defendants
who lack education, employment, and stabilizing ties."95 Con-
gress desired to prevent discrimination in the form of upward
departures against poor, disadvantaged and minority defend-
88. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 543 (9th Cir. 1990).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing the UNrrED STATES SENTENCING COmm'N, GUIDELMuS MAN-
UAL § 5H1.6 (1989)).
91. Id. at 543.
92. 919 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990).
93. Id at 956 (emphasis added).
94. Section 1B1.4 states: "In determining the sentence to impose within
the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted,
the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the
background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohib-
ited by law." U.S.S.G., supra note 19, § 1B1.4 (emphasis added).
95. SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3358 (emphasis added).
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ants.96 By characterizing the background factors as "not ordi-
narily relevant," however, the Commission eliminated
consideration of factors which one commentator has noted have
"frequently and appropriately argued against imprisonment es-
pecially in cases involving poor, disadvantaged defendants." g
96. See Hillier, supra note 41, at 225. The desire to eliminate disparate
treatment based upon discriminatory factors provided the incentive for the
Sentencing Reform Act. Id; see also supra note 16.
97. Hillier, supra note 41, at 225. 'The need for vocational training, edu-
cation, drug counseling or physical care have traditionally inflienced judges to
fashion probationary sentences that include rehabilitative programs designed
to help the defendant to solve the problems that contributed to his or her mis-
conduct." 1d. Conversely, Congress probably did not intend courts to depart
upward in cases in which the defendant does possess education, employment,
and stabilizing ties. United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1989), sup-
ports such a conclusion. The defendant in Burch appealed his sentence of five
years imprisonment for conspiring to possess marijuana with the intent to dis-
tribute it. Burch, 873 F.2d at 766. The district court departed upward to the
maximum sentence allowed under the applicable statute because of the de-
fendant's high level of education and intelligence, his maturity, and his promi-
nent family upbringing. Id. at 767. The district court judge compared Burch to
a juvenile delinquent who does not know better, and described him as "'one of
the top persons, scholastically speaking, [with] all your educational pursuits,
[you are] an extremely gifted, talented individual. You are not the ordinary
person who walks through here."' Id. The Fifth Circuit refused to permit an
upward departure based upon those background factors. Id. at 768. Further-
more, the court found that factors such as the defendant's sophistication and
prominent social background constitute "socio-economic status," a considera-
tion flatly prohibited by the Guidelines. Id.
The application of the court's analysis to an upward departure is highly
significant in light of the apparent inconsistency between § 994(e) and the
other provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act. Interestingly, courts have
failed to place any significance on the fact that Burch involves an upward de-
parture. For example, the Lara-Velasquez court cited Burch in support of its
decision not to depart downward on the basis of the defendant's personal char-
acteristics, which were insufficiently unusual. 919 F.2d at 955. The court
found Burch to "limit the district court's authority to justify a downward de-
parture from an applicable guideline range on a defendant's admirable charac-
ter traits." Id
In Burch, the Fifth Circuit's refusal to sustain an upward departure based
on offender characteristics carried out the intent of Congress in enacting
§ 994(e). Congress recognized a distinction between a downward and an up-
ward departure for the purposes of considering a defendant's background
characteristics. Through its desire to "guard against the inappropriate use of
incarceration," Congress displayed a concern that courts would apply offender
characteristics in a way that would penalize particular defendants. Burch, 873
F.2d at 767. This, in turn, suggests the intent to avoid upward departures
founded upon these factors. The Sentencing Commission should have inter-
preted § 994(e) to discourage upward departures rather than all departures
based on family responsibilities and other offender characteristics. This inter-
pretation would provide an alternative to dismissing the section as anomalous,
while attributing meaning to the permissive provisions of the Sentencing Re-
form Act and its legislative history.
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The present state of disagreement and confusion defeats
congressional intent in another, broader way. The fact that the
Guidelines leave room for differing interpretations leads to the
very disparity that Congress sought to remove from the pro-
cess. Arguably, judicial discretion presently exists within the
literal language of the Guidelines, as offender characteristics
"not ordinarily relevant" are necessarily relevant in the ex-
traordinary case.98 Many courts, however, have failed to recog-
nize this inherent discretion and view consideration of even the
most burdensome and unusual family responsibilities as abso-
lutely prohibited by the Guidelines.99
98. See Federal Courts Study Comm., Tentative Recommendations for
Public Comment, 62, 64 (Dec. 22, 1989), in 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM.,
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITrEE REPORTS JULY 1, 1990 [hereinafter FED-
ERAL COURTS STUDY].
99. Id- The family responsibilities of the defendant in United States v.
Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 527 (7th Cir.) (discussed supra notes 1-5 and accompany-
ing text), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991), for example, easily qualified as ex-
traordinary. Nonetheless, the court bound itself to a rigid prohibition which
did not exist in the literal language of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Guide-
lines have also increased sentencing disparities by shifting discretion from
judges to lawyers. Because the Sentencing Guidelines have limited judicial
flexibility in sentencing, defendants have less incentive to plea bargain and
more incentive to proceed to trial. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 98, at
63. By failing to grant the sentencing court the clear authority to approve
sentences outside of the prescribed range, the Guidelines prevent prosecutors
from offering many concessions to induce guilty pleas. Id. at 62. As plea bar-
gaining constitutes an essential part of the judicial system, however, prosecu-
tors manipulate the Guidelines, according to the Federal Courts Study
Committee, to "induce the pleas necessary to keep the system afloat." Ic&;
Hillier, supra note 41, at 227 (discussing the shifting of discretion from judges
to prosecutors). In the federal system, guilty pleas make up 85-90% of all con-
victions. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 98, at 60-61.
Prosecutors engage in three primary forms of manipulation to enhance
their bargaining power: charge bargaining, fact bargaining and date bargain-
ing. Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Judicial Impressions of
the Sentencing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 94, 94-95 (1989). In charge
bargaining, prosecutors dismiss provable charges to produce lower sentences
than those required under the Guidelines in order to induce defendants to
plead guilty. Id at 94. Faced with cases in which the criminal activity began
prior to the implementation of the Guidelines, some prosecutors dismiss the
later charges which would have fallen under the strictures of the Guidelines, a
practice known as date bargaining. Id- at 95. Even more common is the prac-
tice of fact bargaining, wherein the prosecution will not assert provable facts
which would enhance the sentence under the Guidelines. I& Since prosecu-
tors employ this discretion outside the system, it is no longer subject to judicial
review. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 98, at 61.
Judge McNicols expressed discontent with the Guidelines' effect on
discretion:
Congress has thus shifted discretion from persons who have demon-
strated essential qualifications to the satisfaction of their peers, vari-
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The Guidelines retain disparity in another area as well.
Despite the Commission's attempt to achieve uniformity
through numerical equality, the Guideline's failure to give
courts clear authority to consider pertinent factors such as a de-
fendant's family responsibilities results in disparate punish-
ment for defendants convicted of similar crimes.1 0° If the same
sentence affects two defendants in drastically different ways,
the sentences are not equivalent.' 0 ' Despite Congress's primary
intent to rid the judicial system of sentencing disparity, the
Commission retained and perhaps increased disparity, though
shifting it to different areas.
A final source of confusion surrounding the Sentencing
Guidelines concerns the appropriate authoritative weight courts
should assign to the guideline provisions labeled policy state-
ments. Many courts err in attributing equal weight to the ac-
tual guidelines and to the policy statements. 02  The
Commission discussed offender characteristics in both the
ous investigatory agencies, and the United States Senate to persons
who may be barely out of law school with scant life experience and
whose common sense may be an unproven asset.... In the judicial
arena every decision is subject to review. Every decision rendered
must be grounded on articulated facts and legal theories stated on the
open record. An error in either regard is subject to appeal and rever-
sal. When the decision is made by the prosecutor, there is no public
proceeding, there are no enunciated facts, and legal theories become
irrelevant.
United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637-38 (E.D. Wash. 1990), vacated,
952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Weinstein, supra note 87, at 5 ("One
thing the Guidelines did not do is eliminate the enormous discretion in the
prosecutor, resulting from the wide variety of charges he may bring.").
100. FEDERAL CouRTs STUDY, supra note 98, at 62.
101. Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant's Children at Sentencing, 2
FED. SENTENCING REP. 194, 194 (1990). For example, a "two year prison sen-
tence does not equal two years in prison accompanied by permanent loss of
child custody." Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that the "consistency
produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency." Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). For a discussion of the effects of incarcer-
ation on dependent children, see infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
102. See United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 138 (1st Cir.) (referring to
policy statement § 5H1.4 as a guideline), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 353 (1990);
United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 511 (6th Cir.) (finding that "a sentenc-
ing court should not treat as unique or unusual factors, those circumstances
that the guidelines have already taken into account or expressly deemed irrel-
evant"), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990); United States v. Sutherland, 890
F.2d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989) (referring to § 5H1.6 as a "guideline"). 'Deci-
sions like Brewer and Pozzy that accord binding influence to policy statements
are paying allegiance to tentative ideas that have yet to earn credibility
through research, reasoned analysis or practice, and that Congress has not re-
viewed." Miller & Freed, supra note 46, at 4.
[Vol. 76:957
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
guidelines and the policy statements.103 Interestingly, the pro-
visions relating to a defendant's criminal history are nearly all
labeled as guidelines,1 4 while the provisions addressing the de-
fendant's noncriminal personal history-such as family ties
and responsibilities--are all labeled policy statements. 10 5
Congress intended the policy statements to be "advisory
and non-binding."'1 6 Judicial noncompliance with the Guide-
lines automatically invokes appellate jurisdiction by both the
government and the defendant, while noncompliance with the
policy statements does not confer the same appellate status. 0 7
Furthermore, the legislative history indicates Congress in-
tended that the policy statements serve as a starting point from
which to revise the provisions based upon appellate decisions
and judicial comment before Congress considers enacting them
as guidelines. 08 Despite the clear authoritative differences be-
tween policy statements and guidelines, many courts fail to dis-
tinguish the two, assigning them equal weight when
interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines.109
B. PROPOSAL AND DEFENSE OF SOLUTION
1. Courts versus Sentencing Commission: The Correct
Interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act and
the Sentencing Guidelines
The fact that certain courts depart freely from the Guide-
lines, while other courts do so reluctantly and some not at
all,110 illustrates the existing power struggle between the courts
and the Commission. The courts refusing to depart based upon
family responsibilities perceive such a departure as a violation
103. Miller & Freed, supra note 46, at 3.
104. See U.S.S.G., supra note 19, §§ 4A1.1, 4B1.1, .3, .4.
105. See id. §§ 5H.1, .2,.3, .4,.5, .6.
106. Miller & Freed, supra note 46, at 3 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTORIAL HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELNES 1 (Nov. 1, 1987)). 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) illustrates the nonbinding nature of policy statements. See
supra note 46. Congress required a court to justify every departure from the
Guidelines. "Section 3553(b) establishes no rule restricting departures from
policy statements. Nothing in the statute inhibits a judge from not following a
policy statement." Miller & Freed, supra note 46, at 5. Although Congress
passed the actual Guidelines following a six month waiting period in which
they were reviewed and subject to possible revision, Congress enacted the pol-
icy statements with no similar waiting period. Id. at 4.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988); Miller & Freed, supra note 46, at 4.
108. Miller & Freed, supra note 46, at 4.
109. See supra note 102.
110. See Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 406-12 (study of judicial departure
practices).
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of the Guidelines and an overextension of their authority."'
These courts fail to recognize, however, that both Congress and
the Sentencing Commission gave them the discretion to depart
without violating the Sentencing Guidelines' directives.
To assess the amount of authority delegated to them in
sentencing, the courts should follow the "whole act rule" of
statutory interpretation." 2 Under this approach, courts must
give force to every directive of a statute and interpret the provi-
sions so as not to conflict with the other provisions and state-
ments of the statute."x3
Consistent with the whole act rule, courts should attempt
to ascertain from the Sentencing Reform Act and its legislative
history a general congressional intent and give that intent ef-
fect. Thus, because the statutory language leans toward the re-
tention of flexibility in sentencing," 4 the courts should exercise
that flexibility and impose individualized sentences rather than
allow one restrictive policy statement ("not ordinarily rele-
vant") to remove much of their discretion."-5 In order to effec-
tuate each provision of the Sentencing Reform Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines, courts should view policy statements as
advisory, not prohibitive.
Furthermore, the words "not ordinarily relevant" them-
selves literally indicate the discretion to depart in the ex-
traordinary case. Since the flexibility exists in the language of
the Act and the Guidelines, courts should not tie their own
hands and interpret the Guidelines, as one court warned, like
"robot[s] inside a guidelines glass bubble."116 The courts should
111. See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 99, at 96 (20% of judges sur-
veyed had never departed downward from the Guidelines).
112. "[A] legislature passes judgement upon the act as an entity, not giving
one portion of the act any greater authority than another." 2A SUTHERLAND,
supra note 53, § 47.02, at 139.
113. The Supreme Court has approved of and applied the whole act rule:
When 'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a par-
ticular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in
connection with it the whole statute... and the objects and policy of
the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a
construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature.'
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60
U.S. 183, 194 (1857)).
114. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
115. An alternative to disregarding § 994(e) ("general inappropriateness")
and its Sentencing Guideline parallel § 5H1.6 ("not ordinarily relevant") in
light of the other permissive provisions is to interpret the congressional intent
as discouraging upward departures based upon offender characteristics. See
supra note 97.
116. United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1990).
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view the Guidelines as a "heartland" for the typical case, as
Congress intended," 7 but then recognize the available discre-
tion to depart for the atypical case." 8
The flexibility to depart based on offender characteristics
not only exists in the literal language of the statutory directives
and the Guidelines, but it also existed in the minds of the Com-
mission members when they drafted the Guidelines. A mem-
ber of the Sentencing Commission confirmed that body's
expectation and approval of judicial departures.119 Despite
making an initial choice-numerical uniformity over individual-
ization-the Commission viewed the guidelines, and in particu-
lar the policy statements, as evolutionary concepts, capable of
analysis and revision. 2 0 Because of the experimental nature of
the Guidelines, courts should not hesitate to depart when com-
pelled by extraordinary family obligations. In doing so, how-
ever, courts should clearly articulate the basis for departure for
use in subsequent modifications of the Guidelines.
Although possessing the authority to depart from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, courts should refrain from disregarding
them. Unless a court faces a case involving factors which it be-
lieves the Sentencing Commission failed to consider adequately,
or which compel a sentence outside the guideline range, the
court should adhere to the applicable guideline sentence. Only
upon the court's independent judgment that specific family ob-
ligations warrant departure are the Guidelines not binding.' 12
117. See supra note 39.
118. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing factors
which constitute the atypical case).
119. Nagel, supra note 21, at 105. "I personally don't think departures rep-
resent an indictment of the guidelines. I think they are exactly what we antic-
ipated." Id.
120. There should be departures and they will teach us something
about what should be included in the next iteration of guidelines. It is
the Commission's intent to monitor and analyze the departures over
time so as to learn from them and to use them in refining and modify-
ing the extant guidelines.
Id.; see U.S.S.G., supra note 19, at 2, 4; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Depar-
tures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459,
461 (1988) (discussing the permanence of the Commission, which will enable it
in the future to create more accurate guidelines relating to departure); supra
notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing the experimental nature of
provisions labeled "policy statements").
121. The House of Representatives contemplated and approved of this
result:
[I]f the court finds that the sentence called for by the applicable sen-
tencing guidelines is greater than necessary to comply with the pur-
poses of sentencing, section 3553(a) would seem to require the court
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Courts should also not misinterpret their ability to consider
an offender characteristic such as family responsibilities as a re-
version to the previous individualized sentencing scheme. The
Guidelines provide a framework, within which a judge should
typically impose a sentence. When the judge chooses to depart
from the prescribed boundaries, she must explain the reasons
for the departure. This requirement should dissuade the impo-
sition of sentences based upon impermissible grounds such as
racial discrimination. The appellate review process, to which
all departures are subject, provides an additional check on dis-
cretion. This structure and review should prevent the "un-
fettered discretion" which undermined the indeterminate
sentencing system.' 22
2. Cost/Benefit Analysis of a Prison Sentence
In addition to a thorough and objective statutory interpre-
tation, courts should engage in a sociological analysis of the
costs and benefits of incarceration in the imposition of a sen-
tence. A cost/benefit analysis balances the need for sanctions
against the social consequences of the sanction. i2m In applying
this analysis to decisions about whether to impose a term of im-
prisonment or an alternative, non-incarcerative sentence,
courts should consider the effects of incarceration on depen-
dent children.12 4 Children of offenders suffer severely from
the incarceration of their parents. Studies of child development
have identified typical antisocial behavior that results from the
disruption of stable parental relationships. This behavior in-
cludes withdrawal by young children and delinquent or crimi-
to impose a more lenient sentence. Such an interpretation, it might
be argued, is inconsistent with the Sentencing Reform Act's intention
to limit judicial discretion in sentencing. That argument, however, is
not convincing. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 limited, but did
not eliminate, judicial sentencing discretion. Section 3553(a) does not
give the court unlimited discretion in sentencing, but rather autho-
rizes the court to depart from the guidelines only if the court finds
that the sentence called for by the guidelines is greater than neces-
sary to serve the purposes of sentencing.
United States v. Davern, 937 F.2d 1041, 1046 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting 133 CONG.
REc. 31,947 (1987)).
122. Professor Ogletree presents a similar post-guideline sentencing model
with additional statutory checks on discretion, such as maximum grade levels
by which a mitigating factor could reduce a sentence. See Ogletree, supra note
13, at 1956-58.
123. Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 437-38.
124. Bush, supra note 101, at 195.
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nal behavior among older children.125 Experts maintain that
the "[c]ontinuity of relationships, surroundings, and envi-
ronmental influence are essential for a child's normal
development."''
Distinct from the actual effect of incarceration on the de-
velopment of the child is the cost to society of a sentence that
deprives a child of parental care. Such costs include: foster
care, permanent dissolution of the family if a court terminates
the parental rights of the offender due to incarceration, and de-
pendence upon government aid if the family loses its primary
wage-earner. 2 7 In addition to precipitating dependence upon
government assistance, incarceration could cost society in the
form of criminal delinquency of a child occurring as a by-
product of the family disruption.1 28
125. I
126. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERFSTS OF THE CHILD
31-32 (1979) (emphasis added). These authors analyze the consequences of the
disruption of continuity for children of different ages and conclude that stable
parental relationships are necessary to offset the emotional instabilities which
characterize a child's early life. Id- at 32-34.
127. Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 437-38.
128. d. When deciding whether to incarcerate a defendant with unusual,
mitigating family circumstances, courts should also consider the costs of main-
taining the judicial system. In part because of the perceived restriction on ju-
dicial flexibility in sentencing resulting from the Guidelines, the rate of plea
bargaining-a crucial element of the sentencing system-has decreased.
Although the new minimum mandatory sentences required by Congress for
drug offenses, see Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 429-30, provide perhaps the
primary cause for the reduction of plea agreements, studies also attribute the
reduction to the apparent lack of judicial discretion. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY,
supra note 98, at 62. The ambiguity surrounding judicial authority to depart
from the Guidelines has narrowed the ability of judges to partake in bargain-
ing and, consequently, has reduced defendants' incentives to plea bargain. See
supm note 99; see also Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 404. The reduction in
the number of plea bargains has, in turn, increased the resources required to
process criminal cases. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 98, at 63. The in-
creased number of cases reaching the sentencing stage and resulting in an in-
carcerative sentence since the promulgation of the Guidelines has
consequently increased the workload of judges, the number of trials, and the
time the appellate courts spend resolving sentencing appeals. I& at 60.
The related problem of prison overcrowding constitutes another signifi-
cant societal cost of incarceration. Congress anticipated the effect of the
Guidelines on the prison population and encouraged the Commission to study
and draft recommendations concerning the necessity of changes to the current
facilities. Congress explicitly required the Sentencing Commission to promul-
gate guidelines that would "minimize the likelihood that the [flederal prison
population will exceed the capacity of the [flederal prisons, as determined by
the Commission." 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1988). The Commission declined, how-
ever, to respond to the congressional mandate and failed to tailor the Guide-
lines to limit the foreseeable increase in prison population. Ogletree, supr
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3. Suggestions for the Courts
At the present time, the Sentencing Guidelines mention
family responsibilities only to allow a departure in an ex-
traordinary case. A "departure" by definition is unfixed and
uncertain, "[a] deviation... from an established rule, plan, or
procedure." 29 The Guidelines do not quantify family obliga-
tions in fixing a sentence. For example, the Guidelines do not
assign to family obligations a number of guideline levels which
courts can subtract from the guideline range.'3 0 Absent any
guidance, an attempt by the courts to quantify family responsi-
bilities individually would lead to disparate results between
courts. Because the decision to depart involves a subjective
judgment, courts should apply their discretion to determine the
appropriate sentence for each case.131 Another subjective de-
termination in which the court must ultimately apply discre-
tion involves the qualification of family responsibilities as
"atypical" or "extraordinary." To ensure uniformity to the
greatest extent possible, however, courts should base their
qualification on certain factors which, alone or in combination,
may produce an atypical case. A case involving dependent chil-
dren should form the basis from which a court should consider
note 13, at 1955. Although the statutory directives allow probationary
sentences in more than 66% of the Sentencing Table's potential combinations,
the Sentencing Guidelines permit alternative sentencing in only 17% of the po-
tential combinations. Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 441.
In light of the fact that prisons are presently filled to 60% beyond capac-
ity, the dramatic increase in incarcerative sentences is highly significant. Id. at
418-19. The Bureau of Prisons estimates the holding capacity of federal pris-
ons at 38,072 inmates. As of March 4, 1991, the prison population numbered
60,772. Id. at 419. The Bureau of Prisons predicts that by 1995, 116,890 people
will be incarcerated, more than 70% above the estimated holding capacity for
federal prisons. Id. Currently, the costs of imprisonment exceed $20,000 per
year per individual, as opposed to a cost of $470 per year for a probationary
sentence. Hillier, supra note 41, at 228. As the federal Bureau of Prisons
plans to construct 15,000 new prison cells by 1995 to reduce the overcrowding
rate to 20%, costs of incarceration will likely rise even higher. J. Michael
Quinlan, Symposium on Alternative Punishments Under the New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 1 FED. SENTENCING REP. 105, 105 (1988). In light of the
excessive societal costs of incarceration in the area of prison overcrowding,
courts should not hesitate to exercise their discretionary power of departure in
the appropriate case.
129. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 354
(1976).
130. See supra note 122.
131. Since under the current departure practices, lack of uniformity often
results because of discrepancies between judges in their willingness to depart,
see Karle & Sager, supra note 5, at 412 n.83, clear authority and increased judi-
cial discretion may actually reduce the existing disparity.
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other tangential factors.1 32 The court should then ascertain the
number of dependent children,lca their ages,134 and whether
those children have special needs such as physical, emotional,
or mental disabilities.135 The court should consider the likeli-
hood of the defendant losing custody permanently rather than
temporarily.13 Because of the adverse effects on the children,
the court should sentence, if possible, to avoid the long-term re-
moval or permanent termination of parental rights.
In weighing the above factors, courts must adhere to the
proscription on considerations of race, sex, and socioeconomic
status of the defendant.137 A judge should not, therefore, grant
a downward departure to a female defendant solely based upon
his personal belief that a woman is the more important paren-
tal influence.138 Similarly, a judge should not conclude that one
defendant's social and economic position provides a better fam-
fly environment for a child than another's and depart on that
basis.'3 9 The fact that sex and socioeconomic status may
slightly overlap with family responsibilities, 14 however, does
not preclude a court from such considerations.14' As the Senate
concluded, "The requirement of neutrality with regard to such
132. Because the disruption in the continuity of relationships most harms
the developing child, see GOLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 126, at 17-23, 31-34,
courts should limit the "atypical" case to situations involving children rather
than extending it to elderly or disabled parents or other family members for
whom the line becomes more difficult to draw.
133. A greater number of dependent children may increase the risk of pa-
rental loss and thus should factor in favor of departure.
134. Arguably, younger children are most severely affected by the disrup-
tion of the parental relationship. The effects of the disruption may decrease as
children reach maturity. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 126, at 31-34.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir.) (defendant
supported three mentally disabled children), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
136. If the defendant is a single parent, for example, or has no immediate
family to care for the children, the chances increase that the state would place
the children in foster care or a state institution. Cf. Karle & Sager, supra note
5, at 437-38.
137. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509 (6th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990). The Brewer court, in the absence of more ex-
traordinary circumstances, could not justify a departure on the grounds that
the defendants were mothers of dependant children. Id.
139. Presumably, the requirement of articulating the bases for departure
will prevent racial biases or any other impermissible factors from forming the
grounds for departure.
140. A defendant's lack of economic resources, for example, could relate to
the decision to place her child into foster care.
141. Bush, supra note 101, at 195.
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factors is not a requirement of blindness."'i
In classifying particular family obligations as extraordi-
nary, courts should also weigh counter-considerations, factors
which favor against allowing a departure. A long record of
criminal convictions indicating the defendant's lack of concern
over the possibility of court-imposed separation from her chil-
dren should suggest the defendant's family bonds do not merit
extraordinary consideration. 4 3 The court should also consider
whether the defendant exposed his children to the crime,
which could again indicate a lack of concern for their wel-
fare.'" Finally, the court must scrutinize the sincerity of the
defendant. 45 If the court determines that the defendant in-
voked family obligations merely as a ploy to obtain a lenient
sentence, the court should accord less weight to the conse-
quences of incarceration on the family.'i
If the court concludes that a defendant's family circum-
stances constitute an unusual case, it should then assess the
sentencing options. In light of the societal costs of imprison-
ment, courts should more frequently implement non-incarcera-
tive alternatives such as halfway houses, home detention,
intensive probation supervision, day prisons, and community
service.' 47 Alternative sentencing provides a means by which
courts can satisfy the punitive and deterrent goals of sentencing
while retaining the individual dimension.
CONCLUSION
Confusion over the appropriate weight that unusual family
circumstances should receive in sentencing has led to disparate
results in sentencing. Many courts deprive themselves of the
discretion to impose an individualized sentence as is allowed in
the language of the Guidelines and was intended by Congress.
Rather than interpreting the Guidelines restrictively, courts
should interpret the Guidelines in light of the Sentencing Re-
form Act and its legislative history. Courts should recognize
their ability to depart downward on the basis of extraordinary
family responsibilities.
142. SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3354 n.409.
143. Bush, supra note 101, at 196.
144. Id at 197.
145. Id-
146. Id.
147. See Weinstein, supra note 87, at 20-30; see also ANDREW R. KLEIN, AL.
TERNATIVE SENTENCING: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (1988).
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